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with . . . but not too dangerous to
defeat.”
Similarly, Brad Roberts discusses regional
nuclear war termination, arguing that the
United States would have not only to address the immediate problems presented
by the war but also to ensure that longerterm U.S. interests were served by “winning the peace” that follows. The United
States has to avoid being perceived as a
“nuclear bully” whose power must be
counterbalanced, but neither can it come
off as a “nuclear wimp,” unwilling to
confront an aggressor. Instead, the
course of action chosen must show the
United States to be a responsible and just
steward of the international good.
In the concluding chapter, Victor A.
Utgoff contends that in response to a regional nuclear threat the United States
would likely be far more resolute than
others have suggested and would likely
respond in kind to a first use of nuclear
weapons by an aggressor. He concludes
with a number of policy implications.
The fundamental premise of this book is
that sooner or later the proliferation of
nuclear weapons is going to lead to a
confrontation between the United States
and a nuclear-armed state. While there
are many points of disagreement between
the authors, all concur that such a confrontation will be a seminal event and
will define not only the role of nuclear
weapons but also that of the world’s only
superpower in the post–Cold War era.
All students of national security policy
owe it to themselves to consider the policy implications of this premise. The
Coming Crisis will be valuable to them.
JON GREENE

Commander, U.S. Navy
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Lavoy, Peter, Scott Sagan, and James Wirtz, eds.
Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will
Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 2000. 270pp. $45

The title says it all. This book is a compilation of empirical and analytical data on
the strategic evolution of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) agents and
weapons in the twenty-first century. A
central theme of the book is how new regional players (states and nonstate actors) are likely to convert prevalent
conventional military doctrine and training into nonconventional means of warfare. The book is very ambitious in its
scope; it attempts—overall, successfully—to address systematically conceptual problems in the integration of such
weapons into the military infrastructure,
delivery systems, command and control
procedures, and war plans. More importantly, the editors and the authors of the
various case studies utilize a theoretical
framework to explain and predict future
trends of behaviors, intentions, and capabilities among very diverse players. Realism and neorealism, organizational
theory, and culture are used to flesh out
these unique differences in approach as
well as in the implementation of NBC
programs and doctrines.
Except for the conclusion and the chapter
on terrorism, the chapters are case studies, focusing on Iraq, Iran, Israel, India,
Pakistan, and North Korea. The authors
are specialists who devote a great deal of
effort to describing the relationship between strategy and policy, on one hand,
and between national security and national military strategy, on the other. The
result is a complex web of relationships,
behavioral manifestations, and decisionmaking processes involving an amalgam
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of scientific, bureaucratic, and military
institutions and forces. In the chapter on
Iran, for example, Gregory Giles eloquently argues that Iran was reluctant on
moral and religious grounds to use
chemical weapons during the first few
years of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–87) but
that its policy changed abruptly as a result of rising Iranian casualties and fear
of Iraqi chemical-warfare preponderance.
Hence, realism became key to explaining
the Iranian NBC doctrinal shift after
1987. Although Iran ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention within a few
months of its coming into force, Iran has
opted to pursue a clandestine NBC program. Such weapons are the subject of
intense debate within the increasingly
factionalized, institutionalized, and secularized Iranian political elite today. This
has given rise to “multiple actors playing
roles in a key strategic program[,] . . .
[ensuring] that there will be continued
bureaucratic competition for resources,
missions, and influence.” More significantly, such competition has far-reaching
political, economic, and military implications, associated primarily with command and control mechanisms. Israel (a
chapter by Avner Cohen) and India (by
Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu) also utilize
NBC secrecy and ambiguity to enhance
their conventional deterrence capabilities—Israel to keep its Arab adversaries
off balance and to avoid American
nonproliferation pressure, and India to
keep China, not Pakistan, in check. Pakistan (Zafar Iqbal Cheema), however, apparently sees the development of its NBC
program as a necessity—not a choice—
because in the “absence of conventional
security alternatives and nuclear security
guarantees . . . [such] weapons were
viewed as a necessary counter [to] a perceived threat from India.”
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The chapter by Jessica Stern analyzes the
dynamics of terrorism in the twenty-first
century. She argues that the potential for
nonstate actors to acquire, develop, deploy, and use NBC weapons is growing.
Stern may be correct in her concern. Yet,
although there is a precedent, in that terrorist groups such as the Japanese Aum
Shinrikyo have used such devices, there is
no hard empirical data to support a sustained argument that terrorists will be
going the NBC route, at least in the near
term. Terrorism has become complex indeed; acquiring, assembling, deploying,
and using NBC agents does not mean
that the selected device will be workable
or effective. Moreover, the cost of embarking on such a program for terrorist
causes will almost certainly outweigh the
benefits. Terrorists, at least for now, will
continue to opt for conventional weapons, albeit at more sophisticated and lethal levels. There is evidence, however, of
more credible linkages between terrorism
and technology, and between terrorism
and international finance.
Ultimately, one cannot escape the fact
that among the newly emerging NBC
players there is a diversity of doctrines
and command structures. This will admittedly make it harder to predict possible political and military outcomes; more
significantly, it means that the NBC genie
cannot be put back in the bottle. Will the
current U.S. debate on the Strategic Missile Defense Initiative exacerbate this already volatile situation?
If there is one criticism to make of this
book, it is that it sometimes suffers from
a lack of consistency in terms of units of
analysis under examination (nuclear, biological, and chemical agents vary remarkably in scale of effects, timing, etc.);
some essays weigh more heavily on one
agent at the expense of the others.
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Comparative analysis should instead generalize, with rigor, about similarities and
differences with respect to common phenomena. This book is, however, a valuable addition to the complex body of
literature on strategy, national security,
and comparative political and military
dynamics.
K. A. BEYOGHLOW

Marine Corps Command and Staff College

Mauroni, Albert J. Chemical-Biological Defense:
U.S. Military Policies and Decisions in the Gulf War.
Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998. 226pp. $59.95

Although we lived with the dangerous
specter of nuclear attack for more than
fifty years during the Cold War, concerns
about the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) have virtually
exploded into our consciousness in the
past decade. Since the demise of the former Soviet Union—once referred to as
our “malefactor partner in the concept of
mutually assured destruction”—our fears
seem to focus far less on the threat of nuclear holocaust, and more on the threat
of attack by chemical or biological
agents. The logical point of departure for
this shift in focus seems to be the Persian
Gulf War, when the world learned of a
rogue nation seemingly bent on proliferating these weapons of mass terror.
In this book, Albert J. Mauroni attempts
a historical recounting of U.S. efforts to
deal with chemical and biological warfare
agents on the modern battlefield. Mauroni,
a former U.S. Army Chemical Corps officer
who currently works as a management
consultant specializing in Department of
Defense chemical and biological defense
programs, provides a detailed look at
what was essentially a “cold start”
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go-to-war effort on behalf of the U.S.
armed forces. The consistent premise
throughout this work is that no one in
the Department of Defense (with the exception of the Army’s Chemical Corps)
was even remotely prepared for an encounter with chemical or biological
agents as it readied for war with Iraq.
Convinced at the onset of Operation
DESERT SHIELD that Saddam Hussein
would indeed use WMD against U.S. and
coalition forces, the Pentagon began
what Mauroni describes as a “mad
scramble” to train and equip U.S. forces
to operate in the presence of WMD
agents. He reviews the preparation to defend against exposure to these agents,
and assesses U.S. efforts to protect its
forces against a highly lethal asymmetrical threat. In addition, Mauroni devotes a
chapter to the issue of “Gulf War illness,”
providing a fairly meticulous and forthright discussion of this controversial subject. He concludes with substantive
recommendations on where the future
focus of U.S. efforts to deal with the burgeoning threat of chemical and biological
agents should lie. At a minimum,
Mauroni’s work at dissecting the policies
and decisions of the Gulf War is important if only as a lesson that the United
States must never again be so fundamentally ill prepared to operate in the asymmetrical environment.
There are criticisms to be made of this
book, however. At the surface level,
Mauroni uses far too many acronyms for
the book to be easily decipherable for the
non-Army (and especially nonmilitary)
reader. Although he includes a list of
abbreviations at the beginning to assist
with the veritable “acronym soup” of abbreviations, it becomes confusing and
tiresome to refer back constantly to a
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